Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations by Nitoiu, Cristian
  
Christian Nitoiu 
The Ukraine crisis and the 
conflict/cooperation dichotomy in EU-
Russia relations 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: 
Nitoiu, Cristian (2016) The Ukraine crisis and the conflict/cooperation dichotomy in EU-Russia 
relations. Southeast European Studies and Black Sea Studies . pp. 1-16. ISSN 1468-3857  
 
DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1193305 
 
© 2016 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67022/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: June 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
The Ukraine crisis and the conflict/cooperation dichotomy in EU-Russia 
relations  
 
Abstract 
The Ukraine crisis and Russia‘s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding 
the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine’s popular 
choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv 
seems to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations 
between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been frozen and been directed 
on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict 
and cooperation in EU-Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine 
crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation 
between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to 
ignore key tensions that characterised their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies 
three such tensions: the first emphasises divisions between member states and their impact on 
coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension 
highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests 
have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and 
worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Ukraine crisis and Russia‘s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding 
the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe (Gromyko 2015; Kroenig 2015; 
Monaghan 2015). At the same time, Ukraine’s popular choice and enthusiasm for European 
integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seems to have caused Russia to adopt a 
(neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the European Union 
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(EU) – and the West for that matter – have been frozen and been directed on path towards 
conflict. However, EU-Russia relations have traditionally been characterised by the 
dichotomy between conflict and cooperation (Averre 2009). Periods of cooperation have 
succeeded or overlapped with more conflictual ones, pointing to the ever shifting and 
complex nature of EU-Russia relations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union both the EU 
and Russia have preferred to engage in peaceful cohabitation, aiming at least symbolically to 
strike a partnership – which for some resembled a cold peace (Sakwa 2013; Bugajski 2004). 
Genuine cooperation has mostly occurred between Moscow and individual member states, 
primarily in the areas of trade and energy security (Webber 2000; Haukkala 2015).  
Moreover, the 1990s and early 2000s was a time of compromise and ignorance. On the 
one hand, Russia realised its declining position in the international arena and sought 
recognition as an equal from the EU – and the West (Light 2008). This made the Kremlin 
willing to compromise and accept parts of the EU’s liberal agenda. On the other hand, the EU 
hoped that a modern and liberal Russia was well within reach, and failed to notice the 
resentment developing in Russian society towards the West. Moreover, during Putin’s rule 
the EU ignored most of the warning signs which stressed that Russia was not willing to 
compromise anymore, in this sense creating an increasingly deep chasm in EU-Russia 
relations. The Ukraine crisis seems the ultimate expression of this rift, with the traditional 
conflict/cooperation dichotomy leaning almost entirely towards conflict.   
This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in 
EU-Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article 
contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and 
Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions 
that characterised their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: 
the first emphasises divisions between member states and their impact have on coagulating a 
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common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost 
mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the 
post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between 
the EU and Russia makes conflict between them virtually unavoidable. The development of 
the three tensions since 1991 is explored in first parts of the next three sections, with a claim 
that both the EU and Russia conspicuously chose to ignore them. The three sections then 
focus on the period of the Ukraine crisis and highlight how these three tensions in various 
degrees were heightened, causing the conflict/cooperation dichotomy to lean almost entirely 
towards conflict. The concluding section argues that the Ukraine crisis managed to mitigate 
these tensions only in a limited manner. This means that even though future cohabitation 
might be sought by both the EU and Russia, this will be achieved on unstable foundations, 
with the constant potential of the three tensions arriving again at the boiling point and causing 
a new, possibly even more severe crisis. Empirically, the article relies on official documents 
and statements, secondary data from media and academic reports, together with participant 
observations from interviews conducted with experts and policymakers between 2011 and 
2016 in Brussels, Moscow, London and Berlin.  
 
 
Division among the member states  
The first tension focuses on division among the member states in coagulating a common 
approach towards Russia and its influence on the EU’s lack of coherence in dealing with 
Moscow (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011). This can be thought to be a symptom of the general 
inability of the EU to speak with a single voice on most foreign policy issues (Hill 2003). 
However, even more than in other issues areas in foreign policy, here big member states such 
as France, Germany or Italy prefer to deal bilaterally with Russia – and have even constructed 
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special relationships with it. These relationships have been built on shared economic and 
energy interests, whereby member states sought to boost their trade with Russia or receive 
preferential energy prices (David, Gower, and Haukkala 2013). In this background, the EU’s 
approach towards Russia has lacked solidarity among the member states, leaving some of the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states highly sensitive to Moscow’s use of 
energy supplies and prices as political tools (Baev 2012). On its part, Russia has opted 
towards a geopolitisation of the strategic partnership with the EU, and has sought to profit 
from the lack of unity among the member states (Kuzemko 2013, 10). It has adopted a divide 
et impera approach, trying to play member states against each other, in order to gain as much 
as possible from each bilateral relationship and weaken or prevent a strong united EU 
approach (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008).  
The tension caused by divisions between the member states in dealing Russia became 
more acute with the 2004/2007 Eastern enlargement. In its aftermath some of the new CEE 
member states expressed deeply critical views of Russia and did not envision that their 
support for the  Eastern Partnership (EaP) might create tension with Moscow in the post-
Soviet space (Gvosdev and Marsh 2013). The activism of countries like Poland or Romania 
in the EaP can be seen to derive from the intense cultural, historical or economic ties with the 
countries in the region. Nonetheless, their views have often conflicted with those of Germany 
or France, who put more or less formal pressure on the CEE member states to tone down their 
discourse towards Moscow. In the literature, the CEE member states’ critical stance regarding 
Russia is seen by some scholars as a sign of immaturity and evidence that they have not fully 
internalised European norms and values. By promoting a conflictual attitude towards Russia 
these member states depart from the values which reside at the foundation of the European 
project and have maintained peace on the continent for the past 60 years (Kazantsev and 
Sakwa 2012; Headley 2012).  
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This tension has throughout the last 25 years led to a rather disjointed common EU 
approach towards Russia, with the strategic partnership or the Partnership for Modernisation 
being no more than symbolic and doomed to fail from the start (Casier 2013). As both Russia 
and some of the more influential member states (Germany, France or Italy) sought to advance 
their economic interests by constructing bilateral relations, key issues of contention 
(particularly the security order of the post-Soviet) were conspicuously swept under the rug. 
Moreover, these member states promoted within the EU a Russia first approach, whereby EU 
policies would be proposed or implemented in the eastern neighbourhood only if they did not 
conflict with Moscow security interests (Krok-Paszkowska and Zielonka 2005). In practice 
this meant that the EU made relatively unambitious commitments to the countries in the 
region (Delcour 2010), and led in Russia to the conclusion that the Union was actually an 
ineffective and divided international actor (Haukkala 2010a). When the Ukraine crisis 
erupted in late 2013/ early 2014, the tension caused by the division between the member 
states heightened, contributing to the freezing of EU-Russia relations. This happened because 
the big member states were gradually constrained to renounce their Russia first policy, and 
Moscow had increasingly to deal with a seemingly more united and conflictual approach 
from the EU.  
 
United but still separate during the Ukraine crisis  
Before the Ukraine crisis the strategic partnership that the EU sought to develop with Russia 
remained merely symbolic and was constrained due to the preference of the member states to 
invest more in bilateral relations with Russia. In fact, Russia has preferred such a partnership 
and not having clear agreements with the EU which would have constrained its actions in the 
post-Soviet space (Casier 2013). In the absence of a coherent strategic partnership, Russia 
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accepted only proposals from the EU that suited its interests. Moscow pursued the idea of a 
strategic partnership only as long as it viewed it as a prerequisite for being recognised as a 
great power (Forsberg 2014). As a consequence, when the Ukraine crisis erupted both the EU 
and Russia abandoned almost entirely investing the strategic partnership (European 
Parliament 2015). On the one hand, the prospect of a strategic partnership could not mask the 
individual approaches of the member states. On the other hand, the adoption of common EU 
sanctions and a tougher stance on Russia decreased the symbolic value of the strategic 
partnership in the eyes of the Kremlin (Vieira 2015). 
Even though traditionally the member states have preferred to construct bilateral 
relations with Russia and push in various degrees for a more or less appeasing approach 
towards Moscow, the development of the Ukraine crisis seems at first reading to have led to a 
common EU approach. In practice this is primarily evidenced by the sanctions regime that the 
member states commonly imposed on Russia. Support for sanctions varied according to the 
development of the situation in Ukraine (BBC 2014). In the initial phases of the crisis the EU 
was deeply split, which translated in a lack of practical actions. The CEE member states from 
the onset of crisis pushed for the EU to impose a severe set of sanctions against Russia. On 
the other hand, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) or France pushed for sanctions in the 
wake of the annexation of Crimea, the May 2014 referendums in Eastern Ukraine, the MH17 
tragedy or the offensive against the Ukrainian military in August. In between these moments 
they were rather reluctant to adopt increased sanctions. The breakthrough came, nevertheless, 
in the wake of downing of the commercial airliner and intense fighting in eastern Ukraine 
during the summer of 2014. This made the member states to unequivocally adopt a tougher 
sanctions regime towards Russia. However, even when they pushed for broader sanctions, the 
US criticised the big EU member states for trying to soften the West’s response to Russia’s 
aggressive behaviour (MacAskill, Walker and Roberts 2014).  
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EU sanctions towards Russia have, nonetheless, not affected key areas of trade such as 
energy or transfer of technology, and have not targeted key individuals around Putin 
(Gorodiloff 2015). To a large extent, sanctions have been the result of Germany’s reluctant 
leadership during the Ukraine crisis. Berlin was constrained to take the lead in the EU as no 
other member states were willing to assume responsibility. The result has been an approach 
which is influenced by the tension caused by Germany’s economic interests and the pressure 
to have a common EU approach. It has also been the lowest common denominator between 
the interests and the views of the member states: with some being more appeasing (such as 
Italy, Greece or Hungary), some rather disinterested (Spain or Portugal), others asking for an 
assertive stance and feeling threatened by Russia (the CEE member states), and Germany or 
France balancing between their economic interests and the need to have a strong EU 
response. On its part Russia was caught by surprise by the adoption of EU sanctions as it 
thought that divisions between the member states could not be overcome (Rankin 2014). 
In spite of the agreement on sanctions and common declarations condemning Russian 
aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the approach of individual member states towards Russia has 
not changed dramatically. There is still a preference for dealing on bilateral terms rather than 
through the common framework of the EU. Consequently, the tension underlining the various 
approaches of the member states towards Russia is still present, although in a less significant 
degree. For example, throughout the Ukraine crisis Germany, France and UK preferred to 
have bilateral contacts with Russia rather than empower the High Representative, Ashton or 
Morgherini. Putin spoke to German Chancellor Merkel and British Prime Minister Cameron 
very frequently, but most times no real progress was made towards solving the crisis.  The 
Normandy format in which the Minsk agreements were negotiated also led to the perception 
that Germany and France’s individual approaches towards Russia were the only salient ones 
and set tone within the EU (Socor 2015).  
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Space constraints do not allow a review of way the individual approaches towards 
Moscow of all the member states remained rather constant during the Ukraine crisis. 
Compelling evidence for this can found in the case of Germany (as an example of a moderate 
approach) or the CEE country (as examples of conflictual approaches). Forsberg has recently 
shown that even though Berlin is more willing to criticise openly Russia, the post-Cold War 
Ostpolitik has not transformed, as there is still a deep desire for dialogue, cooperation and 
conciliation with Moscow (Forsberg 2016, 41). While Germany warned Russia of the 
economic cost of continuing its aggressive campaign in Ukraine, Berlin was reluctant to 
adopt hard-line measures. Szabo contends that ‘in the Ukraine crisis, Germany’s commercial 
realism (allowed) it only economic tools with which to respond to Russia’s use of military 
power’ (Szabo 2014, 124). Berlin also understood that Russia’s economic interests in Ukraine 
outweighed those of Germany or the EU. Freedman highlights that most German leaders 
were not keen to undermine the country’s political and economic relations with Russia 
(Freedman 2014). On the other hand, Chancellor Merkel maintained a flexible and somewhat 
ambiguous attitude, presenting mild criticism but also appeasement of Putin’s actions. The 
Kremlin also repeatedly tried to appeal to Germany to maintain its post-Cold War Ostpolitik. 
For example, in his address to the Russian Duma after the annexation of Crimea Putin argued 
that:  
I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand 
me. (…) Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere, unstoppable 
desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten 
this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the 
Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity (Putin 2014a). 
The individual attitudes of the CEE member states have also not transformed in a radical 
manner as a result of the Ukraine crisis; they have become even more conflictual towards 
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Russia.  The CEE member states called for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
to expand its military presence on their territory and have a stronger attitude towards Russia’s 
aggressions in Ukraine (Barnes 2015). During the Ukraine crisis, US leaders visited these 
countries on a weekly or monthly basis and reassured them of ‘the commitment of the United 
States (US) to collective defence under the umbrella of NATO’ (Office of the Press Secretary 
2014). The US increased its naval presence in the Black Sea and NATO troops were sent for 
exercises both in Poland and in the Baltic states. Russia highlighted that NATO’s moves 
represented a violation of the Fundamental Act of the NATO-Russian Council, which states 
that ‘there must be no permanent excessive military presence on the territories of the Eastern 
European states’ (RFE/RL 2014). According to the Kremlin, the attitude of the CEE member 
states forced NATO’s decision and could have destabilising effects for European security 
(BBC 2015). The overt anti-Russian discourse of the CEE member states has perpetuated the 
deep division within the EU as how to respond to Russia. At the same time, rather than 
making Europe more secure, the conflictual approach the CEE member states has made 
Russia increasingly weary of the EU and the way in seeks to outsource its security needs to 
NATO (Gromyko 2015). 
 
 
The geopolitical tension: the EU’s expansion in the post-Soviet space 
Both the EU and Russia have been motivated to spread their influence in the post-Soviet 
space primarily by the need to preserve or enhance their status in the international arena 
(Forsberg 2014; Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth 2014). The collision of their subsequent efforts 
has led to a geopolitical tension in EU-Russia relations. More specifically, this tension 
emphasises the gradual geopolitical conflict caused by the expanding influence of the EU in 
the post-Soviet space. Russia disapproves of any changes to the status quo of the post-Soviet 
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space, and has sought to counter the EU’s advance and influence the region (Samokhvalov 
2014; Allison 2013). This tension can be traced back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the way the West chose to handle it. Some have argued that in the absence of a treaty that 
would regulate security relations on the European continent following the end of the Cold 
War both Russia and the EU have been trapped in a cold peace or strategic impasse (Sakwa 
2013). During the early 1990 and early 2000s, Russia appeared to be looking towards the 
West and seeking to embrace a liberal understanding of international relations. However, 
Russian elites never gave up the ambition of restoring control over the post-Soviet states 
(Bugajski 2010). 
The tension caused by the EU’s expansion in the post-Soviet was never entirety clear for 
European policymakers up until the Ukraine crisis. For example, during the coloured 
revolutions Moscow was not strong enough to take decisive action against the EU’s 
‘intrusion’ in the eastern neighbourhood; this made the EU think that its approach in the 
region was not seen by Russia as a security threat (Haukkala 2010b). In reality, Russia 
perceived the coloured revolutions as a battle in its strategic competition with the West, 
criticising the latter’s interventionism (Gromyko 2015). The tension was made even more 
acute following the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 when European policymakers came to the 
conclusion that Russia was interested only in the security of the post-Soviet space, and that it 
did not view the economic order of the region as a threat to its vital security interests (Larsen 
2012); however, the Kremlin understood the situation in the completely opposite way 
(Snetkov 2014). Moreover, the geopolitical tension has increased due some EU member 
states’ calls for US and NATO involvement in the security order of the post-Soviet space – 
i.e. their overt transatlanticism (Sakwa 2015a). 
The Kremlin has made use of the geopolitical tension in order to strengthen its grip on 
Russian society and increase its domestic legitimacy. By framing the EU as the perpetual 
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enemy that was threatening the Russian hinterland, and that his leadership was the only one 
capable of fending it from the West, Putin (especially in his third term as president) aimed to 
rally public opinion and silence his critics in the public sphere (Saari 2014). Moreover, 
Putin’s inner circle seems now to be dominated by Euroasianists who push for a closer 
alliance with China and a focus on restoring the influence of the Soviet Union in the post-
Soviet space (Tsygankov 2008, 51). 
At the same time, the EU’s expansion in the post-Soviet space together with its lack of 
decisiveness in this endeavour transformed the economic competition between the Union and 
Russia into a geopolitical, zero-sum game (Taras 2014). The EU’s integration project 
developed in an exclusive and asymmetric manner as it merely imposed European rules and 
regulations on the neighbourhood states and did not allow them to associate simultaneously 
with a competing integration (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012) – i.e. the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU). However, this new type of engagement overestimated the EU’s own abilities 
and its willingness to significantly involve in the politics of the countries in the region. For 
example, Langbein and Börzel (2013) find that the EU’s power in its eastern neighbourhood 
has manifested only in relation to a limited number of policy areas. Moreover, the EaP was 
condemned vehemently by Russia, although it aimed to reinforce in a rather limited manner 
the structures and mechanisms already present in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(Trenin 2013). In practice, the geopolitical tension also allowed leaders from the region to 
adopt an opportunistic attitude and play the EU and Russia against each other in order to get 
as many benefits as possible from each of them (Gnedina 2015). 
 
The Ukraine crisis: Boiling geopolitical tensions  
The geopolitical tension started to become obvious for European policymakers in the summer 
of 2013, when the EU increased its pressure on the Ukrainian government to sign the 
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Association Agreement (AA) at the summit which was supposed to take place later that year 
in Vilnius. Until that time the Kremlin did not really take seriously the EU’s integration 
project in the region, and believed that the Union would not be able to have a coherent 
approach towards Ukraine (Haukkala 2010b). As a result Russia also increased its pressure 
on Yanukovych in order to convince him not to sign the AA and opt instead for the EEU. In 
the summer of 2013 Putin had a long chat with Yanukovych in Sochi which apparently had a 
decisive effect in making the Ukrainian government reconsider singing the AA (Neweurope 
2013). To a large extent throughout the second part of 2013 the EU was rather ignorant to the 
pressure exerted by the Kremlin on Ukraine. The EU also ignored the geopolitical tension 
which Putin made clear in his famous 2011 article in Izvestia on the future of an Eurasian 
Union (Putin 2011). In fact, the term ‘Eurasian’ was misleading as Putin was referring more 
to an alternative Russia-led project in Eastern Europe that would have had Ukraine as one its 
main pillars. Moreover, with the summer of summer 2013 the geopolitical tension became 
more salient as the Kremlin increasingly equated the EU’s integration project (i.e. the AA) 
with a threat to its vital security interests (Walker 2013). The EU did t eventually during the 
Ukraine crisis start to understand the importance of the geopolitical tension as it postponed 
the implementation of the economic part of the AA with Kyiv (EurActiv
 
2015). Nevertheless, 
Russia’s hopes of convincing or coercing Ukraine to enter the Customs Union have all but 
dwindled, with the Kremlin’s integration project assuming now a genuine ‘Eurasian’ identity 
towards China and Central Asia (Batchelor
 
 2015).  
Throughout the crisis Russia maintained its perception of a weak and indecisive EU, in 
spite of the sanctions regime. The Kremlin understood that in comparison to the US, the EU 
would be much more willing to appease Russia and seek accommodation, as it was not fully 
committed to defending Ukraine or the post-Soviet space (Cerulus
 
2014). Russian leaders 
were was also aware of the weakness in the EU’s approach in the region, as the Union had 
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not managed to influence significant domestic changes and reforms during Yanukovych’s 
term (Langbein 2015). For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that the 
crisis would have been much easier to resolve if it remained contained to Europe and Russia 
(RT 2014b). In this context the geopolitical tension became heightened as Russia’s 
perception of its own power relative to that of the EU increased. In comparison to the 
coloured revolutions a decade earlier or even the 2009 war with Georgia, Russia believed it 
had a much stronger military position. Moreover, the Kremlin realised after the EU’s 
reluctance to mount a strong resistance to Russia’s intervention in Georgia that the Union 
would not go out of its way to stop Moscow from further intervening in the post-Soviet space 
(Berryman 2012). 
To that extent, the Kremlin has been seeking to exploit the geopolitical tension to 
perceived advantage and waiting for a suitable opportunity to arise in the region. There is also 
a strong possibility that Russia might have devised plans for a possible annexation of Crimea 
after the war in Georgia when it became obvious that the EU or NATO were not committed 
to take strong measures in the post-Soviet space (Kravtsova 2014). For example, Allison 
argues that the rapid speed with which Russia managed to act in Ukraine suggests not only 
defensive military planning for Crimea, but also a more long-term effort to restore the 
peninsula as a platform for power projection into the Black Sea region and beyond (Allison 
2014, 1280). 
Russia’s desire to exploit the geopolitical tension can be attributed to its 
(neo)revisionism and the way it perceived the West as trying to unilaterally shape the world 
order and change the rules of the games (Sakwa 2015b) –  conventional Russian evidence for 
this is the unilateral  independence of Kosovo, the Iraq intervention or the one in Libya. The 
Kremlin has continuously for the past decade denounced the failure of the West to create a 
pluralistic post-Cold War order that would integrate Russia’s views and interests (Putin 
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2014b). In the post-Soviet spacemRussia viewed the EU’s expansion in a zero-sum logic and 
‘did not believe in the supposed win-win opportunities often advocated by the EU’ (Stewart 
2014, 3). However, Russia has never openly admitted its desire to shape unliterary the world 
order, and gave Western leaders reason to think that the geopolitical tension was rather 
insignificant. For example, in his address to the Russian Duma after the annexation of Crimea 
Putin stressed that even though Russia has strived to maintain a sustainable dialogue with the 
EU, the West has taken actions which were ‘aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against 
Eurasian integration’ (Putin 2014a). Germany indeed towards the end of 2015 started 
acknowledging some of Russia (neo)revisionist grievances by supporting the report of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe group of eminent persons. The report 
argues recognizes that the post-Cold War security architecture on the European continent has 
not taken into account Moscow’s concerns. However, the Kremlin argued that this 
acknowledgement came too late, and it does not really mitigate the geopolitical crisis or the 
strategic impasse in relations between Russia and Europe (Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe 2015). 
Domestic developments in the last five years in Russia have also contributed to the 
aggravation of the geopolitical tension. On the one hand, in the aftermath of 2012 protests 
following the election of Putin for a third presidential term, the Kremlin began to foster a 
more nationalistic and militaristic atmosphere in the country (Medras 2015). The West and its 
expansion in the post-Soviet space (i.e. Russia’s sphere of influence) started being presented 
internally as a sign that Moscow is under siege, which, in turn, facilitated the acceptance of 
Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis by the Russian people (Trenin 2015). On the other 
hand, Putin’s actions in Ukrainian have been fuelled by his fear that popular unrest might 
spill over into Russia and be directed against his authoritarian style of leadership. This 
concern stems from the deep scar that the coloured revolutions left on the post-Soviet space, 
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where through street demonstration (and with the support of the West) authoritarian regimes 
were replaced (Ambrosio 2007). Nevertheless, during the Ukraine crisis both Moscow and 
the EU did not address the rising nationalism in Russia and the Kremlin’s concerns for 
political survival – in this way heightening even more the geopolitical tension.  
 
The clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia 
The last tension emphasises the EU and Russia’s contrasting understanding of norms, values 
and legitimacy in the international system (Tsygankov 2014; Rutland 2012; White and 
Feklyunina 2014). On the one hand, the EU puts emphasis on multilateralism solidarity and 
ethical behaviour in international relations. On the other hand, Russia values national 
sovereignty and stability in the international system. The Kremlin advocates a pluralistic 
view of the international system, where international law represents a source of stability in 
the context of increasing contestation of international norms – presenting mostly a rigid 
interpretation of international law (Karagiannis 2014). Moreover, Moscow argues that great 
powers can have a legitimate claim to preserving spheres of interest in their neighbourhood 
(Gretskiy, Treshchenkov, and Golubev 2014). This is in clear contradiction with the 
understanding of the West which emphasises equality among states.  
 In terms of values, the EU promotes in its foreign policy a liberal agenda focused on 
human rights and democracy (European Commission 2007). Russia has increasingly 
embraced in the last decade an overtly conservative agenda which stresses, for example 
stability, family values or the central role of the religion in society (Freire 2012). In the post-
Soviet space both Russia and the EU have sought to promote their values and soft power. 
With the EU becoming increasingly more attractive (economically and culturally) for the 
states in the region during the post-Cold war period, the Kremlin started in the last decade an 
intense campaign to promote its values in the region (Laruelle 2015). This has indeed 
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gradually led to a deep polarisation of the societies in the region and increased the values 
tension between the EU and Russia.  
A significant aspect of the tension is the different way in which the EU and Russia view 
the legitimate use of force in international relations. For the former, the use of force seems to 
be an instrument of last resort in foreign policy, while the Kremlin sees it as a normal aspect 
of world politics. Moreover, the Kremlin has not hesitated in the case of Georgia or Ukraine 
to use force in order to defend the rights of its citizens or Russian speakers. In this sense, 
Russia’s understanding of the responsibility to protect principle (R2P) does not place 
significant weight on democratic governance and human rights. Moreover, the Russian 
understanding of the principle differs from that of the West and is somewhat contradictory 
(Kurowska 2014; Sinkkonen 2011). Moscow does not claim to have a moral duty to intervene 
and protect peoples in the context of widespread violence and conflict. Russia sees the 
principle referring more to the responsibility deriving from sovereignty, together with the 
need to safeguard its citizens living in other states. In practice Russia has associated the R2P 
principle with the fear and instability created by the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space 
in order to challenge the rules of international system (Dunn and Bobick 2014). In this sense 
the Ukraine crisis saw the radicalisation of the way Russia uses the R2P principle and a 
growing contrast with the EU’s own understanding of the principle. Nevertheless, neither the 
EU or Russia have made any significant steps during the last 25 years in order to start a 
dialogue and accommodate their different understanding of the legitimate use of force in the 
international arena. With the Ukraine crisis this tension also reached the boiling point and 
influenced the turn towards conflict in EU-Russia relations.  
 
 
Deeper polarisation and clash of values? 
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The contrast between the way in which the EU and Russia understand world politics – and 
the underlying tensions it creates – influenced the way both actors acted during Ukraine 
crisis. Moreover, as a consequence of the breakdown of cohabitation and the emergence of 
conflict in Ukraine, Russian and European approaches to international relations have drifted 
apart even more. On the one hand, the EU has remained firm in its support for multilateralism 
in solving international crises, while on the other, Russia has reasserted its preference for a 
more pluralistic environment where sovereignty rather than multilateralism should be the key 
principle driving world politics (RT 2015). For example, Russia claimed that Crimea was 
crucial for maintaining its sovereignty as its Black Sea fleet and military forces were under 
impeding threat from the ‘fascist’ government in Kiev. Putin also made a challenge to 
Ukraine’s statehood and sovereignty by denouncing all previous bilateral accords made with 
Kiev (Itar-Tass 2014). Russia’s approach should be understood to be part of Putin’s 
aspiration to redefine the principles of international law, in order to favour a multipolar and 
pluralistic view of the international system where major international players (such as China 
and Russia) could develop and maintain exclusive spheres of interests.  
Part of Russia’s (neo)revisionism has been to try to shape the way in which force can be 
used legitimately in world politics. According to Dunn and Bobick (Dunn and Bobick 2014, 
409), Russia has been actively transforming the principle of legitimate intervention in 
Ukraine by creating a hybrid war without acknowledging direct intervention and staging a 
performance which is meant to coerce the states in the region, but also the West, into 
accepting Russia’s dominance. In Ukraine, Russia claimed that its actions were justified by 
the right to protect its citizens living abroad from the aggression of the ‘fascist’ government 
in Kiev, to respond to the will of the people expressed through referendum to be independent 
or part of Russia, or to safeguard Russia’s sovereignty. Out of these, the protection of Russian 
citizens was the foundation of Russia’s justification. The R2P principle was legitimised 
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through the Constitution of the Russian Federation which guarantees ‘its citizens defense and 
patronage beyond its boundaries’ (The Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993). 
Moreover, Russia’s approach was based on widespread support among its citizens, and 
according to Putin ‘drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national 
unity and the support of our country’s main political and public forces’ (Putin 2014a). Russia 
also felt compelled to act in order to stop a potential humanitarian refugee crisis. For 
example, Russian leaders emphasised that in the absence of Russian volunteers, local defence 
units or peacekeepers a genocide would have occurred both in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.   
Throughout the crisis Russia sent contradicting messages to the US and the EU regarding 
its actions in Ukraine; on the one hand, it argued that it had no intentions to invade or annex 
parts of Ukraine or that its troops were not present in Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine was framed to counter external opposition and the need to defend 
Moscow’s national interest or its understanding of peace in the international system.  
Intervention ‘in full accordance with international law’ was a necessary course action for 
Moscow in order to defend the legitimate interests of Russians (RT 2014a). This type of 
ambiguous discourse is best portrayed in Putin’s justification to the Russian people of the 
annexation of Crimea:  
Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is a decision that we 
need to make for ourselves. Are we ready to consistently defend our national 
interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where? (…) At the same 
time, we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the 
West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good-
neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world (Putin 2014a). 
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A mix of denial of being present in Eastern Ukraine together with European 
unwillingness to accept Russian views on the legitimate use of force in world politics or the 
R2P principle has meant that no real dialogue has emerged between the two regarding their 
contrasting understandings of world politics. This has also led in the post-Soviet space to a 
deep polarisation of societies along ideological lines. On the one hand, the EU is seen by a 
large part of the people in the region as a beacon of liberalism and a path to economic 
development and democratisation. On the other side of the spectrum the conservative ideas 
promoted by Russia managed to attract those people in the region who have been deeply 
disillusioned by the post-Soviet transition period and the continuous failure of their countries 
to modernise under EU supervision. Moscow’s attraction has been complemented by its soft 
power which relies on the legacy of the Soviet Union and the business links, culture, informal 
links, linguistic, cultural and religious ties or the economic integration developed during the 
time of the Cold War (Sherr 2013). Russia has been increasingly using its transformative 
power in Crimea during the last ten years. This has involved funding NGO’s, training 
officials working for the local administration, fostering both open and underground business 
ties with the region, together with increasing its military and intelligence presence (Roslycky 
2011, 313). While polarisation was present before, the Ukraine crisis (and Russia and the 
EU’s subsequent actions and rhetoric) have highlighted two mutually exclusive alternative 
ideologies. In the long term this polarisation could spill over and create other conflicts similar 
to the Ukraine crisis, because as elites in the region will be forced to opt wholeheartedly for 
one ideology and integration project, they will leave disheartened a large part of their 
societies – which might become violently reactive.  
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Conclusion 
The Ukraine crisis shifted the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU-
Russia relations towards conflict. This article has argued that the shift towards conflict is a 
result of the heightening of three tensions. These tensions have been developing in EU-Russia 
relations since the end of Cold War, but have never been addressed in a coherent manner by 
neither side. Rather than mitigating these tensions the Ukraine crisis has (with some 
exceptions) further deepened them. Preserving and ignoring these tensions in the long term 
might led to even more severe conflicts erupting between the EU and Russia in other 
geographical areas or in relation to more sensitive issues for continental and global security. 
Firstly, even though sanctions seem to have made the problem of forging a common EU 
policy towards Russia slightly less relevant, the member states have largely maintained their 
individual approaches towards Moscow. For example, Germany’s behaviour during the 
Ukraine  crisis does not signal a major shift from its traditional post-Cold War Ostpolitik as it 
was cautious in pursuing a tougher stance towards Moscow, and was keen to leave the door 
open for cooperation and dialogue. Conversely, the CEE member states felt even more 
threatened by Moscow and increased their traditional calls for NATO and the US to increase 
their military presence in the region. In a nutshell, the member states still prefer to construct 
individual approaches towards Russia, even though agreement on sanctions is a step further 
towards forging a common EU approach. The tension is, nevertheless, no less significant 
from the perspective of the Kremlin, as the embrace of transatlanticism by more member 
states can increase Russia’s feeling of being cornered and make its leaders engage in further 
aggressive actions.  
Secondly, the geopolitical tension was partly mitigated as the EU understood during the 
Ukraine crisis that Russia equated economic interests to vital security interests in the post-
Soviet space. Moreover, the Kremlin rather than dwelling too long on the prospect of having 
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‘post-Maidan’ Ukraine as one of the building blocks of the EEU, refocused its attention 
towards Central Asia in order to advance the Eurasian project. Nevertheless, Russian and 
European mutual perceptions of their relative power in international relations have remained 
rather fixed. Similarly to before the Ukraine crisis, both the EU and Russia continue to 
overestimate their power and influence in the post-Soviet space while underestimating that of 
the other. The geopolitical tension has also been heightened during the Ukraine crisis as the 
EU has not acknowledged (and ignored) Russia’s (neo)revisionist efforts to shape the 
regional and global order. At the same time, the Ukraine crisis entrenched even more 
nationalist discourse in Russia, with the EU unable (or unwilling) to dispel concerns about 
the West increasingly cornering Moscow, and aiming to overthrow Putin through a coloured 
revolution.  
Thirdly, the contrast between European and Russian values and worldviews has become 
sharper with the Ukraine crisis. The Kremlin is increasingly entrenched in a rigid and 
opportunistic understanding of international law, where concepts such as sovereignty, the 
R2P principle or the legitimate use of force are understood in a discretionary manner and 
upheld only when they suit Russia’s interests. This attitude partly resides from the deep 
disaffection felt by the Kremlin as a result of the perception that the West has unilaterally 
imposed its values in international relations. Moreover, in the post-Soviet the contrast 
between the models promoted by the EU and Russia has become even greater, leading to 
deep polarisation within the countries in the region. More worryingly is the fact that neither 
Russia or the EU (and the West) seem too willing to try to accommodate each other’s 
worldviews and values. As the three tensions are still very much present in EU-Russia 
relations – some even more salient than before the Ukraine crisis – the potential for conflict 
escalate has reached the highest levels since the end of the Cold War.  
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